Constitutional Law--Church and State--Freedom of Religion--The Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 68 Issue 5 
1970 
Constitutional Law--Church and State--Freedom of Religion--The 
Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Law and Society Commons, and 
the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Constitutional Law--Church and State--Freedom of Religion--The Constitutionality 
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 1050 (1970). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol68/iss5/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHURCH AND STATE-FREE-
DOM OF RELIGION-The Constitutionality Under the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of Compulsory 
Sex Education in Public Schools 
It has been said that "[s]ex education, once the domain of the 
church and the home, has by necessity, become a responsibility of 
the schools."1 Indeed, by the operation of most state education stat-
utes, sex education can be made compulsory in public primary and 
secondary schools if it is taught as part of othenvise compulsory 
classes2 or if the local school authorities have prescribed sex education 
courses as a compulsory part of the curriculum.3 While some of 
the state statutes authorize exemptions on religious grounds,~ most 
do not.5 Nevertheless, the introduction of sex education into public 
1. C. JULIAN &: E. JACKSON, MODERN SEX EDUCATION, TEACHERS GUIDE 4 (1967). 
"[M]ore than half the public and parochial schools in the nation have some form of 
sex education •••• " Yuncker, Sex Education: Should It Be Taught in School?, FAMILY 
CIRCLE, Jan. 1970, at 46. 
2. For example, many states require that all schools have courses in subjects like 
biology, health, hygiene, or physiology. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8551 (West 1969) 
(health); !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-6 (health), § 27-11 (sanitation and hygiene) (Smith• 
Hurd 1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-5, 35-7 (1968) (health); N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 3204 
(McKinney 1969) (hygiene and science); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 313.60 (Page 1960) 
(health); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1511 (health and physiology), § 15-1513 (physiology 
and hygiene) (1962); TEX. Eouc. CODE § 21.101 (1969) (physiology and hygiene). Sex 
education taught as an integral part of these courses is thus compulsory for all students, 
unless there is an express statutory provision granting exemption. See note 4 infra. 
3. Most states permit local school authorities to prescribe additional compulsory 
courses as well as those courses specifically made compulsory by statute. See, e.g., ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-25, 33-1 (1968); 
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.60 (Page 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 16-1605 (1962). 
Permissive statutes of this sort do not preclude local authorities from structuring addi-
tional courses in such a way as to grant exemptions. Additional courses such as sex 
education could be made optional by giving the student the choice of taking it or 
another course or by offering it during an otherwise free period. 
4. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 8701 (West Supp. 1970) (exemption from health and 
hygiene classes for religious reasons); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-11 (Smith-Hurd 1962) 
(exemption from instruction about diseases for religious reasons); N.Y. Eouc. I.Aw§ 3204 
(McKinney 1969) (exemption from health and hygiene classes for religious reasons); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.601 (Page 1960) (exemption from periods of moral, 
philosophical, or patriotic meditation for religious reasons); TEX. Eouc. CODE § 21.10-1 
(1969) (exemption from education about disease for religious reasons). In California 
and Michigan, exemptions from compulsory sex education courses are granted for any 
reason. CAL. Eouc. CODE§ 8506 (West Supp. 1970) (exemption from discussion of human 
reproductive organs and their functions and processes upon parental request); MICH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.789(c) (Supp. 1969) (exemption from sex education classes upon 
parental request). Although it might be argued that statutes providing exemptions on 
religious grounds violate the establishment clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I, it is probable 
that this argument is without merit. See text accompanying notes 60-64 infra. 
5. Most state education statutes make no provision in their compulsory-attendance 
laws for exemptions from statutorily prescribed compulsory courses. E.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 35-7, 38-25 (1968); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.03, 3321.04 (Page 1960); 
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schools has not been accomplished without opposition. Certain re-
ligious groups have argued that compulsory sex education is viola-
tive of both the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first 
amendment, 6 as applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.7 This Recent Development will explore the substantive valid-
ity of those attacks.8 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (1962). However, local school authorities, who have 
the power pursuant to most state statutes to prescribe sex education in addition to 
those courses required by statute, also have the power to make sex education optional. 
See note 3 supra. Considering the problems of religious freedom raised by sex education 
courses, particularly in view of the strong emotional and personal nature of the subject 
matter, the exercise of this power to grant exemptions or to structure the courses in such 
a way as to make attendance optional probably is desirable. See notes 8-10 infra. 
Indeed, exemptions on religious grounds may be constitutionally compelled. See text 
accompanying notes 51-54 infra. 
6. See Complaint at 3, 6, 7, Fette v. Board of Educ., No. 4681 (Cir. Ct., Washtenaw 
County, Mich., filed Feb. 16, 1970). 
7. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld the 
right of Jehovah's Witnesses ministers to solicit support for their views door to door, 
despite failure to comply with a state statute requiring licensing of such solicitors, as 
a right protected by the fourteenth amendment, which was held to embrace all the 
liberties secured by the first amendment. 
8. Opposition to sex education is not exclusively religious. Some people believe it 
to be the work of communists or other leftist groups. See Ulman, A Delicate Subject: 
Sex Education Courses Are Suddenly Assailed by Many Parent Groups, Wall. St. J., 
April II, 1969, at I, col. I; Zazzaro, The War on Sex Education, AM. SCHOOL Bn. J., 
Aug. 1969, at 7; McIntire, Communism and the Moral Breakdown in the U.S.A., 
The New Sensitivity 1, 3 (20th Century Reformation Hour). Many parents fear that 
sex education would cause children psychological harm if taught at too young an age. 
Some psychoanalytic writers believe that children pass through a period in middle 
childhood when sexual interests are latent and should not be brought to mind. 
P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER 8e J. KA.CAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY 358 (2d ed. 
1963); Yuncker, Sex Education: Should It Be Taught in School?, FAMILY CIRCLE, Jan. 
1970, at 70-71; NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1969, at 102. Finally, it has been charged that sex 
education courses invade the privacy of home and family and cause children to question 
parental authority. "The State must refrain from so-called sex education in the 
public schools .••• These areas, which the State must respect and not infringe upon, 
are personal intimacies and family responsibilities under God." McIntire, The Bible 
and Sex Education, Sex Education Report I (20th Century Reformation Hour), 
See also Complaint at 2, 3, Fette v. Board of Educ., No. 4681 (Cir. Ct., 
Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Feb. 16, 1970); Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, 9, 
Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., No. 139,710 (Super. 
Ct., San Mateo County, Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1968). The parents in these suits argue that 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment confers upon them the right to 
control the education of their children. Two United States Supreme Court decisions 
might support that proposition. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court 
struck down a law forbidding the teaching of a foreign language or the teaching of 
any subject in a foreign language to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. It 
concluded that the "power of parents to control the education of their own [children]" 
was within the ambit of the due process clause. 262 U.S. at 401. Similarly, in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court, faced with a law requiring attendance at 
public schools, upheld the right of parents to send their children to private schools which 
met state standards. In so holding, the Court stated that "[t]he child is not the mere crea-
ture of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 268 U.S. 
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It is essential to begin by analyzing the doctrinal bases for the re-
ligious objections to compulsory sex education. In general, two types 
of objections are made. First, there are those objections based on the 
notion that sex education must be taught within a context of strict 
morality. According to that argument, knowledge of sex is synon-
ymous with knowledge of evil and therefore must be presented in a 
religious context. 9 Second, there is the view that the mere exposure 
to certain subjects which are covered in sex education courses is 
objectionable from a moral or religious standpoint.10 Under either 
of these doctrinal bases, there is not likely to be any question that 
compulsory attendance in sex education courses does transgress the 
honest, religious beliefs of those who object to such courses.11 
However, not all infringements of religious beliefs are constitu-
tionally impermissible; for instance, in order to prevent the spread 
of diseases, the state may require vaccinations of those who object 
to such medical treatment as a transgression of their religious be-
liefs.12 Similarly, the state may prohibit polygamy13 or require obser-
vance of child labor laws even if the result is to interfere with the 
exercise of an asserted religious practice.14 The issue, therefore, is not 
at 535. Based on statements such as these, at least one state court has held that "the right 
of the parents to select, within limits, what their children shall learn is one of the 
liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment ••• .'' Vollmar v. Stanley, Bl Colo. 
276, 282, 255 P. 610, 613-14 (1927). 
It is submitted, however, that even if there is a right of parents to control the edu-
cation of their children, that right is limited by the state's power to enact laws bearing 
a rational relationship to a valid state interest. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944). State statutes prescribing the curriculum of public schools have been held to 
be rationally related to the valid state interest of an educated citizenry. See Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). Indeed, in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, the Court 
explicitly noted: "Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a 
curriculum for the institutions which it supports.'' 262 U.S. at 402. 
9. " 'For the teaching of sex without the teaching of sin is the work of Satan.'" 
Mdntire, The Bible and Sex Education, Sex Education Report I (20th Century 
Reformation Hour). "Sex education cannot be taught without moral responsibility. 
And the ONLY guide book that true christians [sic] can accept is the HOLY BIBLE.'' 
Letter from Rev. Samuel E. Johnson, Pastor, First Apostolic Church, Ann Arbor, 
Mich., to David Woodward, Jan. 25, 1970. See also Zazzaro, The War on Sex Edu-
cation, AM. SCHOOL Bn. J., Aug. 1969, at 8. 
10. "This group [religious fundamentalists] usually abhors mention of premarital 
intercourse, petting, masturbation and homosexuality in sex education." Zazzaro, The 
War on Sex Education, AM. SCHOOL Bn. J., Aug. 1969, at 8. "The State must not be a 
party in any way to stimulating that which society has already condemned as an evil 
and even as a crime. This involves such matters as fornication, adultery, incest, sodomy, 
rape, homosexuality, and the like." Mdntire, The Bible and Sex Education, Sex Edu-
cation Report I (20th Century Reformation Hour). 
11. When an exemption to a statute of general applicability is sought on religious 
grounds, a court must be convinced that the objection is a religious one, which is 
honestly held by the party seeking exemption. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 
(1944). 
12. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
13. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
14. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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whether the objection to sex education is a matter of religious belief, 
but whether the conceded infringement of a religious belief violates 
the free exercise clause or the establishment clause, as construed by 
the Supreme Court. 
The free exercise clause has often been invoked by religious 
groups to gain exemptions from laws of general applicability.15 The 
most recent expression by the Supreme Court of the standard to be 
applied when an exemption is sought is found in Sherbert v. Verner.16 
That case arose under a South Carolina law, which provided that 
unemployment compensation benefits could be withheld from any 
applicant who refused to accept available employment.17 The peti-
tioner, a Seventh-day Adventist, refused on religious grounds to ac-
cept a job which required her to work on Saturday. The Court held 
that the free exercise clause required South Carolina to carve out of 
its unemployment compensation law an exemption for the petitioner. 
It stated that the petitioner could not constitutionally be constrained 
to abandon her religious convictions regarding her religion's day of 
rest.18 
In reaching its decision in Sherbert the Court reiterated the dis-
tinction, first enunciated in Cantwell v. Connecticut,19 between the 
freedom to believe and the freedom to act. While the first is absolute, 
the second cannot be; indeed, according to the Court in Cantwell, 
"[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of soci-
ety."20 The Sherbert Court then established a three-step analysis for 
determining when conduct prompted by religious belief may be reg-
ulated. Under that analysis, the restriction or regulation of overt 
conduct based on religious belief will be upheld without further 
inquiry if that conduct directly and substantially threatens the public 
safety, peace, or order.21 In Sherbert, since the petitioner's refusal to 
work on Saturday was not a direct or substantial threat to those 
public interests, the Court went on to set up two other standards 
under which the petitioner's conduct could be regulated and her 
claim to benefits denied. Regulation was valid, the Court stated, if 
disqualification from receipt of benefits did not impose any burden 
on the free exercise of the petitioner's religion,22 or if any incidental 
15, See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 
U.S. 141 (1943): Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 
U.S. 413 (1943). 
16. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
17. 374 U.S. at 400. 
18. 374 U.S. at 410. 
19. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
20, 310 U.S. at 304. 
21. 374 U.S. at 403. This principle has been enunciated in numerous decisions. 
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); cases cited in notes 12-14 
supra. 
22, 374 U.S .... t 403. 
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burden on that free exercise was justified by a "compelling state 
interest."23 The Court then held that disqualification from the re-
ceipt of benefits did impose a burden on the free exercise of the peti-
tioner's religion: 
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of 
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandon-
ing one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on 
the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the 
same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a 
fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.24 
Thus, the Court faced the question whether the denial of the peti-
tioner's claim could be justified by a compelling state interest, and it 
concluded that the record failed to disclose any such interest.25 
The same three-step analysis can be applied to compulsory sex 
education. Just as, in Sherbert, the refusal to work on Saturdays did 
not directly threaten the public safety, peace, or order, so too the 
refusal of those opposing sex education to send their children to such 
classes does not directly threaten such interests of public concern. 
Furthermore, there is no question but that requiring attendance at 
sex education courses burdens the free exercise of the religion of 
those who honestly believe that exposure to certain subjects covered 
within those courses is sinful or that sex education must be accom-
panied by moral instruction. Thus, under the Sherbert reasoning, 
the fundamental issue in the instant controversy is whether compul-
sory sex education courses promote a "compelling state interest." 
What constitutes a compelling state interest is unclear. In Sher-
bert, the Court indicated that, even if the state had proved-which 
it had not-that it had a valid interest in preventing claims for un-
employment compensation by those feigning religious objections to 
work, that interest might not be compelling enough to sanction trans-
gression of the petitioner's religious beliefs.26 The Court's statement 
was based on the fact that the state would still have the burden of 
proving that there was no means of protecting that valid state interest 
23. 374 U.S. at 406. See also West Virginia State :Bd. of Educ. v. :Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). In Barnette the Court noted that first amendment freedoms are susceptible 
to restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state 
may lawfully protect. 
24. 374 U.S. at 404. Prior to Sherbert, only direct governmental compulsion in 
the form of fines or imprisonment supported an action under the free exercise clause. 
In Sherbert, however, the Court found that indirect compulsion in the form of 
economic disadvantage could support a claim based on the free exercise clause. The 
Court has not yet extended the notion of indirect compulsion in situations arising 
under the free exercise clause to incorporate informal social pressures such as those 
found in the classroom situation. See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra. 
25. 374 U.S. at 407. 
26. 374 U.S. at 407. 
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without infringing the petitioner's right to free exercise. At the same 
time, however, the Court reaffirmed its prior decision in Braunfeld v. 
Brown,21 in which it held that the state did not have to grant an 
exemption to its Sunday closing laws to businessmen who observed a 
day other than Sunday as their day of rest. The state's interest in 
having one uniform day of rest for all workers was held to override 
petitioner's religious objections.28 There appears to be no discernible 
rationalizing principle which explains why the promotion of a uni-
form day of rest is a compelling state interest for purposes of the free 
exercise clause, while the prevention of fraudulent unemployment 
claims may not be. Thus, determination of what constitutes a com-
pelling state interest must be made on an ad hoc basis depending on 
the facts of the individual case.29 
Since freedom of religion is a preferred freedom,30 however, the 
burden of justifying any infringement is on the state.31 In defending 
against an attack on compulsory sex education, the state might be re-
quired to demonstrate that a greater number of successful marriages, 
a lesser number of extramarital pregnancies, less sexual promiscuity, or 
a reduction in the number of sex crimes is likely to be fostered by sex 
education courses. Furthermore, the state may argue that there is a 
compelling interest in education per se and that imparting useful 
27. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
28. 366 U.S. at 608. 
29. See West Virginia Ild. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the 
Court held that the state's interest in promoting national unity was not sufficient to 
overcome religious objections to participation in compulsory flag salute ceremonies. 
See also In Te Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), in which the Court considered the question 
whether an individual could refuse jury duty on religious grounds and, in a per 
curiam opinion, remanded that question for consideration in light of Sherbert. On 
remand, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, reversing its prior decision, upheld the 
individual's refusal because the state had failed to show an adequate "interest in 
obtaining competent jurors" which would "override relator's right to the free exercise 
of her religion." 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1963). Compare Sheldon v. 
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D.C. Ariz. 1963) (religious objection to standing during 
singing of national anthem in public schools held to be sufficient to override state's 
interest in maintaining order or discipline in classroom), and State v. Everly, 146 S.E.2d 
705 (\V'. Va. 1966) (refusal on religious grounds to serve on jury upheld since state 
made no showing that it was unable to obtain an adequate number of competent 
jurors), with In Te Matz, 296 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Cal. 1969) (state's interest in choosing 
the individuals most suitable for citizenship held to justify denying naturalization to 
those whose religion precluded them from voting, serving on juries, or participating 
in governmental functions), and People v. Woodruff, 50 Misc. 2d 430, 270 N.Y.S.2d 838 
(Sup. Ct. 1966) (state's interest in requiring testimony concerning commission of crime 
held to be a compelling interest as compared to defendant's religious belief that she 
could not give testimony harmful to others). 
30. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) ("the preferred place 
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by 
the First Amendment ••• .'). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1949) 
CTustice Frankfurter, concurring). 
31. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 
144-49 (1943). See also P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CoN5I'ITUTION 19-21 (1964). 
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information to its citizens is a paramount value.32 Indeed, it can be 
argued that unless children learn about sex in the wholesome envi-
ronment of the classroom, they will acquire incorrect information 
about sex in a prurient context. Certainly, it must be recognized that 
only one course is being attacked and that that course is in an area 
which traditionally has not even been included in public school cur-
ricula.33 It might be argued that by allowing objections to one 
subject, the entire curriculum is rendered susceptible to attack. On 
the other hand, it may be that the preferred position which has been 
accorded to religious liberty34 demands that each subject be examined 
separately to determine whether the state's interest in imparting that 
particular knowledge reaches the level of being a compelling interest. 
It is difficult to predict the outcome of this balancing. If the state is 
determined to have such a compelling interest in sex education as to 
outweigh the objections raised, a court will be required to refuse to 
grant an exemption from sex education courses. If, on the other hand, 
the state's interest is found not to be compelling, exemption from sex 
education courses will be required by the free exercise clause.35 
The opponents of sex· education might argue further that, even if 
no compelling state interest is found and consequently the students 
who have religious objections to sex education courses must be 
granted an exemption from those courses, that exemption is still not 
enough to satisfy the requirements of the free exercise clause. Accord-
ing to this argument, requiring the affirmative election of an exemp-
tion from sex education classes places informal social pressures on 
a student to forgo the exercise of his exemption.86 It is arguable that 
allowing such pressures to exist inhibits the student's right to elect 
the exemption and is thus very close, if not tantamount, to compel-
ling a student to take the courses and thereby infringing his right to 
the free exercise of his religion. If that argument is accepted, the only 
viable remedy which will prevent the infringement is a total pro-
hibition of sex education courses in public schools.37 
The Supreme Court has held, in cases arising under the estab-
lishment clause, that informal social pressures can constitute compul-
32. "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
33. However, the mere fact a course has traditionally not been included in a cur-
riculum does not mean that it is therefore unimportant. If that were the case, the 
process of education would stagnate. 
34. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text. 
35. As noted previously, it is probably desirable for local school authorities to 
grant exemptions on religious grounds from sex education courses if they have the 
statutory power to do so. See note 5 supra. 
36. See text accompanying notes 44-46 infra. 
37. See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra. 
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sion.88 In Engel v. Vitale,39 for example, the Court stated: "When the 
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind 
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon reli-
gious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved 
religion is plain."40 The question arises, then, whether the concept 
that compulsion incorporates informal social pressures applies to 
cases arising under the free exercise clause. If the concept does apply, 
the inquiry with regard to sex education courses is whether the neces-
sity of electing to exempt himself in fact creates such compulsion on 
the student as to inhibit his free exercise of the right so to elect. 
The Supreme Court, in utilizing the notion that the informal 
social pressure to conform may constitute compulsion, has never ap-
plied that notion in cases arising under the free exercise clause.41 
Furthermore, the Court has stated in dictum that such indirect social 
pressures are not sufficient to cause a violation of the free exercise 
clause.42 These informal social pressures to conform were clearly at 
work in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.43 In that 
case, the Court held that those school children objecting on religious 
grounds could not be required to participate in compulsory flag salute 
ceremonies conducted in the classroom, but it did not hold that the 
objectors had to be excused from the classroom when the ceremony 
took place. Clearly, these children were subject to informal social 
pressures to participate in the ceremony. Thus, Barnette supports the 
proposition that the state is not required to eliminate the informal 
social pressures which children might feel to abandon their religious 
convictions. It may reasonably be concluded, then, that the concept 
of social pressure to conform as inhibiting an election to be exempted 
has no relevance to a case arising under the free exercise clause. 
But even if notions of pressure to conform were applied in a sit-
uation involving the free exercise clause, it appears that there is not 
sufficient pressure accompanying the election of exemption from sex 
education courses to support a finding of compulsion. In Engel v. 
Vitazeu and Abington School District v. Schempp45-both establish-
ment cases in which compulsion was found-the children had been 
38. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962). 
39. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
40. 370 U.S. at 431. 
41. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 413 (1943), however, the Court did find that 
economic disadvantage was an indirect form of compulsion that was prohibited under 
the free exercise clause. See note 24 supra. 
42. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 233 (1963). 
43. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
44. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
45. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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given the option of either temporarily leaving the classroom or 
remaining in the classroom but not participating in the religious 
exercises. The basis for the Court's finding of compulsion lay in 
the fact that by the former tactic the child had to make himself 
obviously different by leaving the classroom and returning at the 
completion of the religious exercise, and in the latter situation, the 
child had to bear a sense of isolation since he remained in the class-
room but did not participate in the religious exercises. Significantly, 
in each of these cases, the child was in direct and immediate contact 
with his peers when he exercised his belief. The same degree of pres-
sure may not be involved when a child can choose simply not to 
enroll in a particular class. At least in situations in which the school 
day is divided into periods, with breaks between classes, the child 
would not be required to focus the attention of his peers on himself 
by leaving the classroom. Of course, in a setting in which there are 
no breaks between classes, the pressures to conform are virtually the 
same as those condemned in Engel and Schempp. Nevertheless, as 
noted previously,46 a trial court faced with this question should hold 
that all notions of social pressure are inapplicable and hence unavail-
able to support a finding of violation of the free exercise clause. 
Assuming, however, that a court does find notions of pressure 
applicable to cases arising under the free exercise clause, and assum-
ing further that it finds that there exist pressures sufficient to inhibit 
children in the exercise of their religious beliefs, that court would 
then have to fashion appropriate relief. The only remedy which a court 
can provide in these circumstances is to require the total abolition 
of all sex education courses in the public schools.47 The Supreme Court 
has never required such a drastic remedy in a situation in which a 
program with secular educational objectives incidentally offends rights 
of a particular religious group in the free exercise of its religion. Thus, 
in Barnette, while the Court held that those objecting on religious 
grounds to compulsory flag salute ceremonies could not be required to 
participate in them,48 it did not hold that the ceremonies had to be 
abolished. Furthermore, if a court did abolish sex education courses 
because such courses incidentally offend religious beliefs, that deci-
sion would arguably violate the establishment clause. In Epperson 
v. Arkansas49 the Court struck down, on the basis of the establish-
ment clause, an Arkansas statute which prohibited the teaching of 
evolution in the public schools. The Court stated that "[t]here is and 
46. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
47. 0£ course, the school could make sex education an extracurricular activity, 
available to students only at the close of the normal school day. Such a program 
would be free from objections based either on the free exercise clause or on the estab-
lishment clause. 
48. See text accompanying note 43 supra. 
49. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State 
to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the princi-
ples or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma."60 Thus, under 
Epperson, the state is required to plan its curriculum primarily on the 
basis of educational considerations and without reference to religious 
sensibilities. 
In summary, the doubtful relevance to the free exercise clause of 
the notion of informal social pressures, 51 the uncertainty that compul-
sion would be found under that theory even if it were applied, 52 and 
the possible violation of the establishment clause implicit in a total 
abolition of the program solely on the ground that it incidentally 
offends religious beliefs53 all support the conclusion that granting 
exemptions from sex education courses is the only relief which may be 
required by the free exercise clause. 54 
Permitting such exemptions, however, may not adequately sat-
isfy yet another objection based on religious grounds. An at-
tempt might be made to prevent sex education courses from being 
taught at all in the public school on the ground that the teaching of 
such courses violates the establishment clause. Indeed, the traditional 
remedy for a violation of that clause is the abolition of the program 
which constitutes the establishment of religion.55 
The argument that sex education courses violate the establish-
ment clause turns upon the definition of religion. In Torcaso v. Wat-
kins/'6 the Supreme Court held that religious liberty is not limited to 
theistic beliefs. Thus, the Court struck down a provision of the Mary-
land constitution which required that specified state officials, as part 
of their oath of office, declare a belief in God. In its opinion, the 
Court noted the fact that "[ a ]mong religions in this country which do 
not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence 
of God [is] ... secular humanism .... "57 The argument can be ad-
vanced, then, that unless sex education courses are presented in a 
religious context, the state is thereby establishing the "religion" of 
secular humanism. 
This establishment argument, however, is likely to be rejected. It 
fails to distinguish secular humanism, as the term is used to describe 
our culture and institutions, and secular humanism as a philosophy 
50. 393 U.S. at 106. 
51. See text accompanying notes 42•43 supra. 
52. See text accompan}ing notes 44-46 supra. 
53. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
54. Moreover, although a contrary argument can be made, granting exemptions to 
those who object to sex education on religious grounds is consistent with the establish-
ment clause. See text accompanying notes 60-63 infra. 
55. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). 
56. !167 U.S. 488 (1961). 
57. 367 U.S. at 495 n.11. 
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or, according to the Court in Torcaso, a religion which holds that 
God is essentially irrelevant to man. Unless sex education courses 
affirmatively espouse the view that God is irrelevant to matters of sex 
and sexual behavior, they should not be vulnerable to the argument 
that they constitute an establishment of religion, even of a secular 
religion. The decision of the Court in Abington School District v. 
Schempp58 supports this view: 
It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted a 
"religion of secularism" is established in the schools. We agree of 
course that the State may not establish a "religion of secularism" in 
the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, 
thus "preferring those who believe in no religion over those who 
believe .... " We do not agree, however, that this decision in any 
sense has that effect.59 
Furthermore, a problem arises from a logical extension of the argu-
ment that sex education courses constitute an establishment of reli-
gion. Presumably, the teaching of many subjects without reference to 
God could be attacked as promoting secular values and hence as effec-
tively establishing a religion of secular humanism. But if all such 
courses were required to be excluded from the curriculum, the state's 
ability to carry on an effective program of education would be seri-
ously impaired. Thus, it is clear that the failure to present sex educa-
tion in a religious context does not, by itself, establish a religion of 
secularism in violation of the establishment clause. 
There is yet another argument based on the establishment clause. 
It has been seen that the free exercise clause may require exemption 
of individuals from sex education courses if they object to those 
courses on religious grounds.60 Professor Kurland has argued, how-
ever, that religious considerations cannot be a basis for classification 
or for governmental action in any form: 
The freedom and separation clauses should be read together as 
stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a 
standard for action or inaction because these clauses read together 
as they should be, prohibit classification in forms of religion either 
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.61 
Under this "neutrality" theory, the granting of exemptions from sex 
education courses in response to religious objections would violate 
the establishment clause.62 
58. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
59. 374 U.S. at 225. 
60. See text accompanying note 35 sup,·a. 
61. Kurland, 0/ Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 96 
(1961). 
62. Of course, if Professor Kurland's theory had been applied from the outset, the 
question whether granting the exemption violates the establishment clause would never 
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Although the Court has sometimes employed the language of neu-
trality, 63 that concept, as outlined above, has not been accepted as the 
controlling test of constitutionality under the religion clauses. The 
Sherbert decision is clear authority for the proposition that the state 
can, and in some cases must, grant exemptions on religious grounds 
from programs of general applicability.64 
Since granting exemptions on religious grounds from sex educa-
tion courses does not create an establishment of religion, then, the 
validity of a person's claim to such an exemption turns on whether 
the free exercise clause of the first amendment is held to require such 
exemptions. That determination, in turn, depends upon whether a 
court reaches the conclusion that the state's interest is compelling65 
and consequently that those opposed to sex education do not have the 
right to remain selectively ignorant. Unless such a compelling interest 
can be found, a court presented with this issue must hold that the 
free exercise clause requires that those who object to sex education 
courses on religious grounds must be exempted from participating in 
those courses. 
have been reached. Under his theory, those opposed to compulsory sex education on 
religious grounds would not be entitled to an exemption, because requiring attendance 
at such classes would not violate the free exercise clause. See id. 
63. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218-23 (1963). 
64. 374 U.S. at 409; cf. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
65. See text accompanying notes 26-50 supra. 
